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THE AEGIS BMD GLOBAL ENTERPRISE
A “High End” Maritime Partnership
Brad Hicks, George Galdorisi, and Scott C. Truver

F

or more than three decades, beginning soon after the end of World War II, the
United States and the Soviet Union faced off against each other. The concept
of “mutual assured destruction”—MAD, the U.S. threat of massive retaliation
to a Soviet first strike—became America’s Cold War de facto strategic defense
policy. In March 1983, however, President Ronald Reagan asked whether ballistic
missiles could be destroyed before they reached the United States or its allies,
thus catalyzing efforts for a national ballistic-missile-defense program that would
undermine the need for MAD. That same year, the U.S. Navy commissioned USS
Ticonderoga (CG 47), the first of what is to become a fleet of more than eighty
Aegis warships. In 2012, these trends have converged, and Aegis ballistic-missile
defense (BMD) is an increasingly important component of a robust national
BMD System (BMDS).
National BMDS has morphed from President Reagan’s original vision of a
system to deter and, if necessary, defeat Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) to one focused on deterring or defeating shorter-range ballistic missiles
fired at the United States or its allies and friends by
rogue nations or terrorist groups. So too the “pillars” of
Rear Admiral Hicks, USN (Ret.), former commanding officer of the Aegis cruiser USS Cape St. George the national BMDS have changed. As other air, ground,
(CG 71) and former Program Director, Aegis BMD,
is Vice President, Naval Surface Radars, Lockheed and space pillars have advanced in fits and starts, and
Martin MS2. Captain Galdorisi, USN (Ret.), is dias related programs have been initiated and, somerector of the Corporate Strategy Group at the Space
times, canceled, the seaborne component of national
and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific. Dr. Truver is Director, National Security Programs, Gryphon BMDS has become an increasingly central component
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of U.S. regional ballistic-missile defenses. Aegis BMD is
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now moving toward a role in the defense of the American homeland as well.
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As more countries—many with hostile intentions toward U.S. allies in the
Asia-Pacific region and Europe—have acquired the requisite technologies during
the past three decades, many U.S. friends and allies have been obliged to contend
with the threat of ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). In northwest Asia, both Japan and Korea have built or are building
Aegis BMD-capable ships. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies in
Europe have been dealing with ballistic-missile defense through the alliance’s
Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) program and, since
2009, also through the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA), comprising
“Aegis Afloat” and “Aegis Ashore.”
This new approach now also includes forward-basing four Aegis BMDcapable warships in Rota, Spain. “With four Aegis ships at Rota, the alliance is
significantly boosting combined naval capabilities in the Mediterranean, and
enhancing our ability to ensure the security of this vital region,” Secretary of
Defense Leon Panetta noted on 5 October 2011.1
These ships will also support NATO’s critical efforts to build effective missile defense.
Alongside important agreements that were recently concluded with Romania, Poland,
and Turkey, Spain’s decision represents a critical step in implementing the European
Phased Adaptive Approach. The United States is fully committed to building a missile
defense capability for the full coverage and protection of all our NATO European
populations, their territory and their forces against the growing threat posed by ballistic missiles.

Today the steady growth of Aegis-capable ships in the U.S. Navy—as well as an
increasing number of world navies fielding such ships—presents new opportunities and challenges. The portion of the Navy’s fleet that is capable of ballisticmissile defense is increasing from twenty-one ships now to a planned ninety-four
in 2024.2 Given the well-publicized demand for these assets, Aegis BMD unquestionably is becoming an increasingly important component of BMD planning
and operations of the unified commands’ combatant commanders.
But some are questioning whether the Navy can afford to see multimission
Aegis BMD ships abandon general-purpose, Navy-specific missions—such as air,
surface, and subsurface defense and precision strike for carrier and expeditionary strike groups—to support the combatant commanders directly with their
BMD capabilities.3 Some view Aegis BMD through the same lens as they would
the strategic ballistic-missile submarine program and ask whether Aegis BMD
is a mission the nation needs but the Navy cannot afford. However, Aegis BMD
is an increasingly important element of the nation’s maritime strategy, and it
differs from the ballistic-missile submarine in a way that enables Aegis BMD to
satisfy both combatant-commander ballistic-missile-defense demands and Navy
general-purpose requirements.4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/6
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Moreover, the Navy and the nation have an opportunity to leverage more fully
Aegis BMD capabilities to provide territorial defense as well as protection of coalition naval task forces. The vision, first expressed in 2005, of a former Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, of a “thousand-ship navy”—now
transformed into a Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), in which nations and
navies increasingly work together to ensure security of the global commons—is
reaching fruition as the U.S. Navy works with increasing regularity with coalition
partners in global and regional partnerships. Because some of these countries are
acquiring Aegis-equipped ships, a nascent “Aegis Global Enterprise” is evolving,
in which navies work together to capitalize on the capabilities of these ships for
integrated fleet air defense and even ballistic-missile defense.
The vast majority of GMP missions, however, have been on the “low end” of,
or completely outside, the “kill chain”—target identification, dispatch of forces,
decision and order to attack, and destruction of the target. Such tasks as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and antipiracy patrol dominate the shared
mission set. With the increasing threat of ballistic missiles that can be armed with
WMD, however, the Aegis BMD capabilities present in the navies of U.S. allies
and friends can now provide the Global Maritime Partnership with a means to
address the “high end” of the kill chain with combined, coordinated, ballisticmissile defense: the Aegis BMD Global Enterprise.
This potential is already manifest in the Asia-Pacific region in the close working relationship between the United States and Japan. Korea and Australia could
well join this Aegis network soon, giving the four governments the means to address not only territorial BMD but also coordinated BMD of fleet units operating
together. In Europe, plans are well along to provide robust territorial defense of
European nations with ALTBMD and the EPAA. Together, these systems provide
a nascent BMD capability today and promise an even more robust capability as
the EPAA evolves over the next decade and a half.
But as demonstrated in Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Libya, NATO and the
nations of Europe have equities often well beyond the territorial boundaries of
the European continent. Also, a European military deployed beyond Europe’s
borders will always have a naval component. This is therefore a propitious time
to begin to link European allies more completely into an Aegis BMD Global Enterprise in much the same way the U.S. Navy is linked to its Asia-Pacific partners
—Japan today, Korea soon, and thereafter Australia in the near future—in a highend Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partnership.
A BMD IMPERATIVE
The need for effective BMD has increased in the twenty-first century. More than
thirty countries deploy ballistic missiles today, compared with only nine in 1972.5
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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Potential enemies possess both ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and today’s rogue leaders view WMD as weapons of choice, not of last
resort. In 2007, the last year for which complete records are available, potential
adversaries launched 120 ballistic missiles in tests and demonstrations. These
foreign ballistic-missile launchings, especially in the short-to-intermediate-range
category, occurred particularly in the People’s Republic of China, North Korea,
and Iran.
The broadened ballistic-missile threat, moreover, crosses strategic-, operational-,
and tactical-level boundaries. Since the inception of U.S. BMD systems in the
late 1980s, the main driver of their current versions—including Aegis BMD—
has been the threat posed by rogue nations like Iran and North Korea. Today, it
is Iran’s organic missile development that poses perhaps the most immediate,
technically developed threat to the interests of the United States and its allies and
friends. Several midrange Iranian ballistic missiles have been launched over the
past several years.6 In 2011, Tehran launched numerous ballistic missiles during its GREAT PROPHET exercise. Some of these missiles were capable of striking
American bases in the region as well as Israel, the Arabian Gulf states, and Turkey.
The threat from Iran’s ballistic-missile developments takes on new urgency
when juxtaposed with that nation’s WMD program. Then–CIA director Leon
Panetta warned in 2010 that it could be a mere two years before Iran was able to
threaten other states with nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles.7 Likewise, the Defense Intelligence Agency has reported that Iran could field a WMDarmed ICBM capable of reaching the United States by 2015.8 Coupled with its
determination to acquire WMD, it is Iran’s missiles that pose the gravest threat
to U.S. and allied interests and to Middle Eastern, South Asian, and European
allies—an assessment underscored by the International Atomic Energy Agency
in November 2011.9
Ballistic-missile threat planning at both the regional and strategic levels must
also take into account the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which already
has conducted a nuclear weapon test. North Korea possesses a growing ballisticmissile force that includes short-range Scud C, medium-range No Dong, and
intermediate-range Taepo Dong 1 missiles, some of which have been transferred
to other nations as well. South Korean defense minister Kim Kwan-Jin told his
country’s parliament in June 2011 that North Korea may have already developed
nuclear warheads small enough for ballistic-missile payloads. Likewise, former
U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates in 2011 said that North Korea’s missiles and
nuclear weapons would pose a threat to the United States within five years.10
The actual pace of Iranian and North Korean intercontinental-range weapon
development is still the subject of debate, at least in open sources. There is no

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/6
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doubt, however, that the ballistic-missile threat at the regional or theater level is
burgeoning. As the then director of the Joint Integrated Missile and Air Defense
Organization, Rear Admiral Archer Macy, told a congressional subcommittee,
“Congress and our warfighters have said the most pressing threat for our deployed forces today is the increasing number of Short Range Ballistic Missiles
(SRBMs) and Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs). Without going into
classified details, suffice it to say that the sheer number and types of these threats
grows [sic] daily and the nation needs to find a way to deal with them.”11
As is the case with the ICBMs that they aim to develop, Iran and North Korea
undoubtedly intend to create “strategic” effects with short-to-intermediaterange weapons in their own neighborhoods. In some scenarios, they expect their
ballistic-missile forces to generate concrete, operational-level military effects as
well, particularly in antiaccess and area-denial contexts.
Iran and North Korea are not alone in leveraging this aspect of potential ballistic-missile employment. China also is crafting an antiaccess/area-denial strategy
for the western Pacific based in part on the operational-level use of ballistic missiles. As underscored recently in these pages, “China seeks the capacity to find
U.S. aircraft carriers roughly a thousand miles from the mainland and to attack
them with homing ASBMs (antiship ballistic missiles).”12 The most prominent
aspect of this threat is China’s development of the world’s first “carrier killer”
ballistic missile, the DF-21D. Another commentator has declared, “The DF-21D
is the ultimate carrier-killer missile.”13
Indeed, as The Economist has pointed out, “The Pentagon has described China’s programme as ‘the most active land-based ballistic- and cruise-missile programme in the world.’ Missiles are good value. Compared with a fully equipped
aircraft-carrier, which might cost $15 billion–20 billion, a missile costs about
$1m. . . . And American strategists are closely watching an experimental anti-ship
ballistic missile with a manoeuvrable warhead, which could make it hard for
American fleets to approach the Chinese shore.”14 A January 2011 New York Times
editorial captured the level of concern regarding China’s emerging capabilities:
Beijing’s drive to extend its military and territorial reach is making America’s close
allies in the region nervous and raising legitimate questions about American diplomacy and future military procurement. The commander of America’s Pacific forces
recently revealed that China could soon deploy a ballistic missile capable of threatening American aircraft carriers in the region. The Pentagon has a long history of
hyping the Chinese threat to justify expensive weapons purchases, and sinking welldefended ships with ballistic missiles is notoriously hard. But what should rightly
concern American military planners is not so much the missile but the new Chinese
naval strategy behind it. China seems increasingly intent on challenging United States
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naval supremacy in the western Pacific. At the same time it is aggressively pressing
its claims to disputed offshore islands in the East and South China Seas. Washington
must respond, carefully but firmly. The Pentagon must accelerate efforts to make
American naval forces in Asia less vulnerable to Chinese missile threats by giving
15

them the means to project their deterrent power from further offshore.

Some would downplay the threat posed by China and the DF-21D missile, arguing that—as a result of the “Walmart Factor” that intertwines the two economies
—state-on-state conflict with China is not likely.16 However, China needs only to
make the likely cost to the United States of intervening in western Pacific affairs—
to counter Chinese threats against Taiwan or bullying of neighbors over disputed
claims in the South China Sea—high enough to render intervention no longer a
reasonable deterrent.17 Moreover, China’s increasing dependence on Mideast oil
creates plausible scenarios in which it would export the DF-21D to countries like
Iran. Given the marginal success of ongoing nonproliferation efforts, DF-21Ds
could find their way to yet other governments or even to transnational or terrorist groups with animus toward the United States, its allies, or friends.
To counter the most pressing part of this spectrum of ballistic-missile threats—
states already possessing WMD-armed ballistic missiles—the United States has
fielded an initial national-level BMDS, integrating land, sea, air, and space elements. The first priority of the BMDS implementation strategy—establishing
a limited defensive capability against North Korean ballistic missiles—has largely
been achieved, with Patriot Advanced Capability–3 (PAC-3) batteries, the GroundBased Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, the forward-deployed AN/TPY-2 radar,
and Aegis BMD ships for long-range search, cueing, and engagement.
The Navy’s contribution, built around the Aegis weapon system, to U.S. ballisticmissile defenses has grown in importance in recent years, even as national-level
BMDS has expanded to encompass other potential threats. The Aegis BMD system has been integrated with fleet and joint force war-fighting standards and
BMDS command, control, battle-management, and communications (C2BMC)
elements. Aegis BMD interoperates with ground-, air-, and space-based sensors
and other in-theater assets, including the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) system.
The Aegis weapon system’s adaptability has enabled the Navy to add improved
hardware and software to successive Aegis “spiral” (phased) upgrades. The Aegis
Combat System today consists of four major components: the AN/SPY-1 radar,
the Aegis weapon system, the Mark 41 vertical-launching system (VLS), and
the Standard surface-to-air missile family. Aegis BMD capability receives “block
upgrades” every two years, increasing its capabilities at each step. The present
configuration of Aegis BMD, Aegis 3.6, includes the BMD weapon system teamed
with the advanced SM-3 Block IA missile.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/6
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The success of Aegis BMD arises from an acquisition strategy supported by a
rigorous systems-engineering and integration approach and fueled by substantial
and steady investment in baseline and upgraded system development. The Aegis
weapon system represents nearly fifty years of research, development, testing,
and real-world performance, and its missiles more than sixty years. All this undergirds Aegis BMD. This success can be seen in the results of its test program,
which as of late 2011 has involved twenty-six live firings at sea since January
2002. These tests have become progressively more challenging and operationally
realistic and have enjoyed unprecedented success: twenty-one hits in twenty-six
shots, an 81 percent success rate, in spite of the fact that through 2011 the Aegis
program accounted for only 10 percent of annual Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
budgets.18
The twenty-fifth test—designated Flight Test Mission (FTM) 15—occurred
on 15 April 2011, when the MDA conducted the first-ever “launch on remote”
test of the system against an intermediate-range “separating target,” a warhead
separating from its booster missile. In FTM-15 the guided-missile destroyer USS
O’Kane (DDG 77), with a standard Aegis BMD system, fired a Standard Missile–3
Block IA missile in response to remote data provided by a forward-based AN/
TPY-2 radar. This pitted for the first time an in-service SM-3 Block IA missile against an intermediate-range (1,800–3,400 miles) modified Trident I/C-4
ballistic-missile target, an LV-2. The demands of this test were well beyond Aegis
BMD’s original design, which focused on short- and medium-range threats. The
LV-2 had flown in two previous BMD live-fire tests but had not been hit—until
FTM-15.
Importantly, FTM-15 used technologies and systems that are at sea and in
service today. There were no changes to O’Kane’s BMD suite for the test. Moreover, the success unveiled new possibilities for Aegis BMD using technologies and
systems already available. Also important about FTM-15 is that it linked the ship
to remote sensor data to increase coverage area and responsiveness. Once this capability is fully developed, interceptors—no longer constrained by the detection
range of the Aegis radar against an incoming missile—can be launched sooner
and fly farther.
The twenty-sixth Aegis BMD flight test, FTM-16, occurred on 1 September
2011. The primary goal was to track and engage a separating ballistic-missile
target with the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 Weapon System and the SM-3 Block IB missile,
the block-upgrade successor of the SM-3 Block IA.19 FTM-16 was the first flight
test of the Block IB. While the test yielded no intercept, USS Lake Erie (CG 70)
successfully detected and tracked the target and guided the SM-3. FTM-16 highlighted the difficulties and complexities of the ballistic defense mission. In accord
with the Aegis “build a little, test a little, learn a lot” philosophy, the Navy and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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the MDA will glean important information from FTM-16, incorporate it, and
continue to advance Aegis BMD capabilities.
Aegis BMD’s accomplishments are even more impressive in light of the complex technical challenges that all BMD systems must overcome. For example,
THAAD went zero for six during the 1990s before achieving two hits. Then, after
a five-year hiatus and redesign, the system achieved an eight-for-eight record.
Likewise, the GMD system had eight successful intercepts in fifteen attempts.
However, the two tests in January and December 2010 were failures; this performance was behind the MDA decision to restructure the GMD test program.
A “FOUNDATION OF GREATER COOPERATION”
Aegis BMD functions as an integral node in the overall, integrated national BMDS
but also can operate independently to defeat ballistic missiles. Furthermore, Aegis BMD maintains this capability while also being able to carry out other naval
warfare missions. This versatility makes Aegis BMD valuable as a component of
an international effort to provide collective defense against ballistic missiles. The
threat of WMD-armed ballistic missiles is no longer a U.S.-centric issue. During
the past decade nations in Europe and Asia have increasingly looked for means
to counter the emerging threat to their territories and forces. This presents new
possibilities for the combined, coordinated, Aegis BMD enterprise.
The potential for a global BMD effort was highlighted in a 2009 report by
the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense. It recommended limiting
fixed, ground missile-defense deployments based on GMD in favor of expanding theater/regional defenses centered on sea-based missile defenses (along with
Aegis Ashore, land-based SM-3 missiles, and THAAD system radars). The report
recommended, “Equip additional U.S. vessels with the Aegis anti-missile system.
Encourage U.S. allies equipped with Aegis/SM to do the same.”20
The Foundation: Aegis Abroad
The diffusion of Aegis BMD capability abroad is occurring quietly. Governments
that have made naval force-structure investment decisions based primarily on
inwardly focused national interests have discovered that their investments also
enable them to combine their resources in collective defense. As the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review acknowledged,
Other allies already own or are working with the United States to acquire specific
capabilities, such as naval vessels equipped with the Aegis defensive system that could
be adapted to include a missile defense capability. . . . A primary U.S. emphasis is on
ensuring appropriate burden sharing. The Administration recognizes that allies do
not view the specifics of the missile threat in the same way, and do not have equal resources to apply to this problem, but there is general recognition of a growing threat
and the need to take steps now to address both existing threats and emerging ones.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/6
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This effort to create a broad BMD enterprise builds on the current participation of allied navies in the Aegis program. This global effort started with a foreign
military sales relationship with Japan, subsequently expanded to relationships
with Australia and Korea, and now includes a commercial connection with Spain
as well as an enterprise between Norway and Spain.22 Several other states have
expressed interest in acquiring the Aegis weapon system and Aegis BMD. Importantly, Australia and other countries that are acquiring the Aegis system are
stipulating that the systems they buy must have the capability of adding BMD in
the future.
The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was the first foreign navy to
construct Aegis warships. The JMSDF as of late 2011 operated four Kongo-class
destroyers; the lead ship of the class was commissioned in 1993. In 2000, the
JMSDF won approval for two improved units, known as the Atago class; the lead
ship of that class was commissioned in 2007.
Sharing, in light of an increasing regional threat, the U.S. interest in building
ballistic-missile defenses, Japan decided in 2003 to upgrade its Kongo class with
an Aegis BMD capability. U.S. foreign military sales upgraded all four ships accordingly, with SM-3 Block IA missiles. Japan subsequently decided to upgrade
its Atago-class ships with Aegis BMD as well. That upgrade allows the JMSDF
to meet the tenets of its New Defense Program Guidelines, which call for a total
of six Aegis BMD-equipped ships to defend the country from missile threats, in
conjunction with U.S. Navy warships.23
U.S.-Japanese cooperation extends also to the SM-3 missile. The United States
and Japan signed a memorandum of agreement in 1999 to cooperate in the
development of the SM-3 Block IIA, with Japan contributing both funding and
know-how. The Japanese technical contribution includes risk reduction in the
areas of the kinetic kill vehicle, second-stage propulsion, and the nose cone. The
success of the program led the U.S. Department of Defense to initiate talks aimed
at urging Japan to relax its decades-long arms embargo and export the SM-3
Block IIA to other countries, including U.S. European allies. In 2011, the Japanese
government gave its assent to export the SM-3 Block IIA.24 This U.S./Japanese
cooperation on Aegis BMD writ large and SM-3 Block IIA development specifically, as well as trilaterally among Japan, South Korea, and the United States, is
increasingly evident in high-level Japanese publications, such as the 2011 Defense
of Japan white paper, as well as in various conference and symposia reports where
Japanese defense policy is discussed.25
Across the Sea of Japan, South Korea has announced plans to build six 5,600ton KDX-IIIA Aegis-equipped destroyers beginning in 2019 to complement the
three Sejon-Daewan KDX-III Aegis destroyers that was in service by 2012. Moreover, in 2011 South Korea declared that it was establishing a defensive system to
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2012
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combat air-breathing (that is, generally, cruise missile, either ramjet or turbojet
powered) and ballistic-missile threats from North Korea. Scheduled to be in
place by 2015, the Korea Air and Missile Defense system will be built around the
capabilities inherent in its Aegis-equipped destroyers and its modified PAC-3
ground-based interceptors.
The Aegis weapon system is becoming an antiair/BMD weapon of choice for
other navies also. The Spanish navy in early 2012 operated four Aegis-equipped
air-defense frigates of the Alvaro de Bazan (F100) class, with another under construction. Spain’s interest in Aegis and its shipbuilding expertise have been “exported” to the Norwegian and Australian navies. In 2011, the Royal Norwegian
Navy received the last of five frigates of the Fridtjof Nansen (F310) class—a somewhat austere but still capable version of the F100—built by Navantia shipyard in
Ferrol, Spain. The Australian government likewise is partnering with Navantia
to build three air-defense destroyers of the Hobart class at the ASC Shipbuilding
facility in South Australia.
Following in the path established by the U.S. Navy, non-U.S. Aegis operators
have been taking steps to exploit the system’s BMD capabilities. The JMSDF
has progressed farthest in this regard, closely integrating its activities with its
American counterparts. The destroyer Kirishima was the first foreign warship
to participate in a U.S. Aegis BMD flight test, in June 2006. Eighteen months
later, during the JMSDF’s first flight-test mission, Kongo became the first ship
of an allied navy to engage successfully a ballistic-missile target. Between 2007
and 2010, four separate JMSDF ships launched SM-3 missiles at medium-range,
separating-warhead targets.26 Spain too has evaluated the possibilities presented
by Aegis BMD. The Spanish navy’s Mendez Nunez (F104), outfitted with BMD
software, tracked a ballistic-missile target during a 2007 flight test.
The network framework of the Aegis enterprise enables other European navies, those that do not operate Aegis warships, to join a broader, Aegis-centered
naval BMD architecture. The Netherlands navy’s Tromp, a frigate fitted with a
modified SMART-L surveillance radar and the Advanced Phased Array Radar
(APAR), demonstrated this potential when it tracked a ballistic-missile target
during a December 2006 Aegis BMD flight test. The German navy also operates
three frigates fitted with SMART-L, APAR, and the Mark 41 VLS. Denmark is
planning to build similarly equipped patrol frigates, suggesting another avenue
by which BMD capability can migrate across NATO navies.
Aegis Ashore
The diffusion of Aegis capabilities globally was accelerated when the Barack
Obama administration announced a new U.S. ballistic-missile defense policy
in September 2009.27 President Obama’s decision upended the George W. Bush
administration’s plan to place missile-defense radar sites and ground-based
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol65/iss3/6

10

Hicks et al.: The Aegis BMD Global Enterprise

H I C K S , G A L D O R I S I , & T RU V E R

75

interceptors in Eastern Europe, opting instead for a “Phased Adaptive Approach”
(PAA)—a global sea- and land-based missile-defense capability centered initially
on the Navy’s Aegis BMD system and the SM-3.28 The decision to make this major
shift in U.S. ballistic-missile policy—deferring the planned fixed-site groundbased system in Europe in favor of Aegis BMD afloat and ashore—was a direct
response to the threat of short-to-intermediate-range Iranian ballistic missiles
carrying WMD, slower than anticipated development of Iranian ICBMs, and a
desire to engage Russia—which was vehemently opposed to GMD deployment
in Eastern Europe—in BMD plans.29
At the November 2010 NATO Lisbon Summit, President Obama highlighted
the importance of the Phased Adaptive Approach as well as the potential of Aegis
BMD to undergird global partnerships:
We must strengthen the full range of capabilities that are needed to protect our
people and prepare for the missions of tomorrow. . . . Another necessary alliance capability is missile defense of NATO territory, which is needed to address the real and
growing threat from ballistic missiles. The Phased Adaptive Approach to European
missile defense that I announced last year will provide a strong and effective defense
of the territory and people of Europe and our deployed American forces. Moreover,
it forms the foundation of greater collaboration—with a role for all allies, protection
for all allies, and an opportunity to cooperate with Russia, which is also threatened by
ballistic missiles.

30

The PAA comprises four phases. In Phase 1 (2011), existing sea-based Aegis
missile-defense ships and radars have been deployed to defend against short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles potentially threatening southern Europe. On 7
March 2011, USS Monterey (CG 61) left its home port of Norfolk, Virginia, for a
six-month deployment to the Mediterranean as the first Aegis BMD ship to deploy specifically in support of the EPAA.31 This historic deployment was widely
reported in the national and international media.
In PAA phases 2 (2015), 3 (2018), and 4 (2020), the Aegis SM-3 missiles will
be successively upgraded to provide coverage against medium- and intermediaterange missiles. By Phase 4, the Block IIB variant of the SM-3 should have an
intercept capability against ICBMs as well.32
Momentum had been growing in Europe to build an alliance-wide missiledefense system compatible with Aegis BMD; Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO’s
secretary general, declared, “Missile defense presents the greatest potential for
enhancing our cooperation.”33 The issue of collective ballistic-missile defense
was a major theme during the Lisbon summit, which approved a plan for Aegisenabled European BMD as a core element in NATO’s new strategic concept:
“NATO will actively seek cooperation on missile defense with Russia and other
Euro-Atlantic partners.”34
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NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Admiral James Stavridis, USN, noted
that a plan to link the American PAA with a NATO missile-defense shield to provide a European theater-wide BMD shield is under development by U.S. European Command.35 Well before the summit, NATO’s Active Layered Theatre Ballistic
Missile Defence program had conducted tests with the U.S. C2BMC system, with
the ultimate, long-sought goal of international command-and-control interoperability. All twenty-eight NATO allies were already engaged in discussions as
to how to connect the European members’ short- and medium-range theater
missile-defense systems via NATO to the U.S. long-range missile-defense system.
AN AEGIS BMD FOCUS FOR THE GLOBAL MARITIME PARTNERSHIP
By early 2012, Aegis was deployed on eighty-eight ships, with another eighteen
under construction or planned. The vast majority of these belong to the U.S.
Navy, but the number of non-U.S. Aegis platforms is growing as well. Additionally, more nations are buying or considering BMD capabilities for their Aegisequipped ships.
The value of encouraging the increased adoption of Aegis-like capabilities—as
well as interoperability with existing Aegis platforms afloat and ashore—is clear.
Even the current, somewhat circumscribed, distribution of Aegis assets constitutes
a foundation for a potential “sensor/shooter” mix for a global ballistic-missile
defense enterprise. The shooter component can be shared, as well as the partners’ agreed-on rules of engagement. For example, if the United States and Japan
agree to form a defensive sensor shield over Japan and U.S. forces surrounding
Japan against a North Korean missile launch, this shield can be accompanied by
a missile-defense strike capability against the North’s launch sites. The urgent
need to deepen Japanese collaboration with the United States for missile defense
in response to North Korea’s testing of nuclear weapons has been recognized by
both governments.36 As South Korea proceeds along its current path, it too could
well join the Aegis Afloat BMD partnership.
At the end of the day, sovereign interdependence and interoperability will
remain core attributes of any Aegis global enterprise. The Aegis BMD system is
already integrated and interoperable with other U.S. assets, and it will eventually be brought to the same standard with regard to coalition operations as well.
Adoption of Aegis-type capabilities by allied militaries does not have to mean the
exact replication of U.S. equipment and architecture, as demonstrated by South
Korea’s concentration on a national, vice regional, missile-defense plan. At the
technical level, however, reliance of non-U.S. assets on American hardware and
software in systems like Aegis goes a long way toward syncing allied capabilities
and interoperability.
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In Europe, the decision as to whether and how to connect the European NATO
allies’ short- and medium-range theater missile-defense systems to the U.S. longrange missile defense system will be critical to the coherence of alliance-wide
BMD. A high level of commitment to international partnership on the parts of
both the United States and its allies—already evinced by ALTBMD and C2BMC
shared situational-awareness tests—will encourage interoperability initiatives.
This interoperability will, in turn, help ensure the success of the U.S. Phased
Adaptive Approach.
Ultimately, commitment to international partnership by the United States and
its allies and friends to make Aegis BMD afloat a bulwark of global missile defense will do much to prepare all concerned for combating the growing threat of
ballistic missiles of all colors and hues. It also offers the strong potential—more
than anything else has in the years since Admiral Mullen’s 2005 speech—to gird
the Global Maritime Partnership for “high end” warfare. But this will not happen
without leadership and stewardship at the highest level.
TOWARD EXTRAORDINARY REWARDS
Close cooperation in the area of Aegis BMD between the United States and Japan,
possibly Korea, and potentially Australia does not in itself qualify as an “Aegis
BMD Global Enterprise.” But to include European nations in an Aegis-afloat
enterprise of capabilities approaching those planned for the ALTBMD/EPAA
system would. But why would European nations, with defense budgets dwarfed
by that of the United States, embark on such an enterprise? The reason is clear:
NATO and the European governments have interests often well beyond the territorial boundaries of the European continent.
European navies are now deployed worldwide fulfilling the vision of a Global
Maritime Partnership: supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, fighting
in Libya, conducting antipiracy patrols in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere, and
supporting humanitarian assistance operations around the world. There could be
no more propitious time to begin to link more completely European allies in an
Aegis BMD Global Enterprise, in much the same way the U.S. Navy is now linked
to its Asia-Pacific partners in a high-end Aegis BMD Global Maritime Partnership. Such an enterprise would enable these nations—with U.S. participation
—to deal with such compelling threats as China’s DF-21D “ship killer” ballistic
missile, especially if this missile is exported to China’s friends. This creates an
ideal opportunity to create a “high end” Global Maritime Partnership supported
by Aegis BMD.
But it is unlikely that such a venture would succeed without ongoing U.S. leadership, the same sort of leadership that is supporting sea-based Aegis BMD for
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territorial and fleet ballistic-missile defense today in the northeast Pacific as well
as sea-based and land-based ballistic territorial missile defense in Europe. Clearly,
U.S. leadership could be what accelerates the morphing of a now-nascent Aegis
BMD Global Enterprise in Europe into a global Aegis BMD afloat capability.
“Leadership” often means “funding.” In the face of the most draconian U.S.
Defense Department budget cuts in a generation, plans for enhanced MDA or
Navy funding to add to the Aegis BMD capabilities of partner nations will receive
intense scrutiny. But given the manifest benefits to the nation and to a 280-ship
U.S. Navy of supporting and sustaining a higher-end global maritime partnership than exists today, even a modest investment could well reap extraordinary
rewards.
The U.S. Navy already does this in the area of command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence, providing the Combined Enterprise Regional
Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS) to allied and coalition partners to
facilitate their participation in various operations and exercises.37 The United
States could spearhead international Aegis BMD weapons burden sharing—
creating a pool of SM-3 missiles for use by NATO navies when they deploy together out of theater.
There is a growing worldwide commitment to Aegis ballistic-missile defense,
a commitment with broad potential to field an international global enterprise
capable of defending against the most imminent, and growing, threat to nations
and navies, on land and at sea alike—the threat of ballistic missiles, particularly
those armed with weapons of mass destruction. The Aegis Global Enterprise is
the key to girding the Global Maritime Partnership for the reality of “high-end
warfare.”
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